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The School Finance Redesign Project
The School Finance Redesign Project (SFRP) encompasses research, policy analysis, and public 
engagement activities that examine how K-12 finance can be redesigned to better support 
student performance. The project addresses the basic question, “How can resources help schools 
achieve the higher levels of student performance that state and national education standards 
now demand?”
Check in with us periodically to see what we are learning and how that information may 
reshape education finance to make money matter for America’s schools. You can find us at 
www.schoolfinanceredesign.org.
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Foreword
From the early 1990s through today, controversies about public spending on elementary 
and secondary education have grown as states have adopted performance standards 
pledging that every child will learn enough to become an independent productive citizen 
and as No Child Left Behind has put teeth in these expectations. Some educators say that 
meeting higher standards requires more money. Others claim that existing resources are 
sufficient to pay for higher performance, if only funds were used more productively. While 
plaintiffs have asked courts to determine what amount of spending is adequate to get 
students to standards, analysts of various stripes have argued that greater expenditures 
alone will not lead to better results. Moreover, critics of demands for more money point 
to cases in states and cities where major spending increases were misspent, with little or 
no impact on student learning. Though no one seriously argues that more spending could 
never lead to school improvement, there is compelling evidence that without changes in 
the way resources are distributed, used, and accounted for, Americans could end up with a 
more expensive, but not necessarily more effective, public education system.  
In this environment, governors and state legislators particularly have asked two questions: 
How much money will it take for all students to meet standards? And how should the 
money be spent to ensure that result? The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation asked the 
Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE) to create a School Finance Redesign 
Project (SFRP) to help elected officials, practitioners, and the public better understand 
how education finance systems now work and to identify new options for deploying K-12 
resources to support state and national educational goals. Initiated in 2003, the project has 
grown to include more than 30 separate analyses.
SFRP was designed to address five questions:
Are public education funds now focused on student learning? If not, what stands  ■
in the way?  
Are there good ideas about potentially more focused and effective uses of funds to  ■
promote student learning?
Are there good ideas about better ways to spend money to attract and reward  ■
quality educators? 
Do we know enough now to say exactly how much money is needed to bring all  ■
children up to standards and to say how money should be spent?
What can policymakers do to ensure that the “right amount” of money is distrib- ■
uted equitably, used productively, and accounted for meaningfully?
This study by Marguerite Roza, Kacey Guin, and Tricia Davis addresses the first question 
by tracing how funds targeted for students with identified learning needs are channeled 
through federal, state, and local levels of the finance system and ultimately bear on students 
and learning. Their careful and path-breaking analysis points to major problems inherent 
in the ways governments allocate and track funds intended to address the challenges of 
poverty, disability, or language proficiency. The study demonstrates how differences in gov-
ernmental agendas, state rules, finance formulas, local politics, and other factors work at 
cross purposes so that the current system of channeling targeted dollars to high-needs 
students is anything but intentional. In fact, the authors demonstrate how conflicts among 
federal, state, and local funding purposes and practices prevent targeted dollars from 
reaching the students they are intended to help. In this circumstance, educational goals are 
not fulfilled, students are not served, and lessons are not learned that would help policy-
makers and others better understand how much to spend or how to spend it to close the 
achievement gap.
For policy makers looking for the “right” amount to spend per student type, the results of 
this study suggest that until governments create better-functioning finance systems, no one 
can possibly identify the level of funding that is required to address these challenges. The 
authors demonstrate the need to redesign distribution and resource reporting practices as 
a way to better align and track resources with student needs.  Specifically, they recommend 
distributing dollars (not services, staff, and the like) on the basis of student characteris-
tics, changing allocation formulas and removing other barriers to coherent allocation, and 
tracking and reporting all dollar allocations to schools by student need. These steps, they 
argue, will better channel funds from one governmental layer to the next, thus improving 
the prospect that resources can help to accomplish important educational goals.
Jacob Adams 
Claremont Graduate University
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Introduction
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has called the nation’s attention to one of educa-
tion’s most intractable challenges: closing the gaps in achievement between students 
with different needs. In fact, NCLB changed the fundamental expectation of schooling. 
Where in recent decades, the challenge confronting states was to provide students with 
equal learning opportunities, today’s bar is higher: schools are expected to ensure that 
all students reach a defined level of performance. And while 
the education system progresses in its efforts to identify 
the differing needs of students, in many cases augment-
ing services toward addressing these needs, the effects on 
achievement gaps between groups are disappointing.
Educators and policymakers know that some students arrive 
at school without a basic command of English, with disabili-
ties, or from backgrounds of intense poverty, each of which poses unique challenges in 
helping those students meet performance standards. They also know that these circum-
stances call for increased resources to enable all students to realize the hopes of the NCLB 
initiative. As a result, many educators push back, arguing that making adequate yearly 
progress requires an adequate investment into the real costs of schooling.  
As education policymakers grapple with approaches for allocating educational resources 
in this new environment, they increasingly seek information to better understand how 
much should be spent on students with differing needs. Some policymakers look to revise 
fiscal policy in response to studies that cost out parts of the system, while others push for a 
complete overhaul of the way resources are allocated (e.g., advocating for a student-based al-
location system). In both cases, they expect that the experts 
should know what to spend to ensure that a non-English 
speaking student, a hearing- impaired student, or a student 
with reading disabilities is able to reach the same level of 
proficiency as other children. And because performance 
goals are now a matter of law, it seems only reasonable that 
we should know how much it costs to achieve them. The 
problem is, we don’t.
When policymakers and reporters ask us for such information, we find ourselves repeated-
ly explaining that there is no industry standard for allocating a particular level of funding 
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per pupil and that existing research on this question has yielded dramatically different 
figures for “what it would take” to enable different types of students to meet standards. 
They persist logically, hoping to at least learn from what other states or districts are doing. 
If there is no standard, they suggest, certainly there must be a list of what other localities 
are spending to educate students with identified needs. When 
we tell them there is no such list, we have grown accustomed 
to the disappointed sighs that come with the realization that 
school funding is far more complicated than it should be.
Some studies have investigated a particular spending area 
(e.g., bilingual education) or a single revenue source (e.g., 
the federal government). Resources, however, come from 
different levels of government; arrive as programs, grants, 
and staff ratios; target different types of students; and are 
accounted for in incomparable ways. A state policymaker might be able to determine how 
much the state allocates for bilingual education, but will not know how these funds fit 
together with local dollars, federal programs, or basic expenditures to boost spending for 
non-English speaking students. As a result, policymakers have no sense of the degree to 
which their targeted dollars are something extra for these high-needs students. Do the 
earmarked funds augment spending for bilingual education students by 5 percent or 50 
percent? There is no easy way to know. Trying to determine the real spending levels for any 
one type of student requires a complex dissection of the data.
To date, no comprehensive analysis of funding from all levels of government exists that 
provides a straightforward answer to the question of how much is spent on different 
student types. Thus, the original purpose of this study was to attempt to find such answers. 
The research team dove deep into spending documents from 
the federal government to the local level in four states to 
create a spending picture that shows how much is spent on 
each student type, where the funds originate, and how the 
spending patterns differ from place to place. 
But in gathering the relevant data, we uncovered more than 
just the allocations for different types of students. We also 
stumbled across the realization that what determines the amount spent on each type of 
student need is a function of more than just student performance; it also has to do with the 
fine print in state rules, as well as local politics, differences in concentrations of students, 
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labor contracts, school size, and more. As a result, spending ratios by student type vary 
widely across states, districts, and schools, with little apparent logic behind the variability. 
In fact, where targeted funds originate at one governmental layer, the various influences 
in the fiscal system can and do have the effect of working at cross-purposes, such that the 
ultimate spending increments are anything but what the policymakers intended. 
The evidence has clear implications for those trying to use targeted funds to close the 
achievement gap: namely, that the current system of disbursing education funds from 
separate governmental layers works against the best intentions to target funds for student 
needs. The purpose of this report is to clarify for policymakers how allocation policies at 
different levels work together or in conflict to affect what is ultimately spent on different 
student types. And while the findings are at times startling, the recommendations are clear. 
Intentional, efficient, and coherent resource allocation policies require changes such that 
the system (1) distributes dollars (not purchased resources), (2) channels funds from each 
governmental layer all the way down to schools, (3) deploys funds as a function of student 
characteristics, (4) is free of allocation details and other constraints that inhibit a coherent 
allocation, and (5) tracks and reports all allocations to schools by student need.
Policy Problem
addressing Performance Gaps in the dark
All eyes are now on achievement gaps. Accountability reforms have brought attention not 
only to performance disparities between races, but also between students with different 
identifiable needs, resulting from poverty, disability, or limited English proficiency. For 
many policymakers, the first step in addressing these performance gaps is to adjust fiscal 
policy. Yet as policymakers revamp their existing funding formulas to address different 
students’ needs, they do so in the dark.
First, there is a lack of clarity on how resources are currently 
tied to different subgroups. At the basic level, for a state 
policymaker trying to target an allocation to certain student 
types, there exist no baseline data on what is already being 
spent on each type of student among their own districts or 
As policymakers revamp 
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across schools within districts. In most states, school districts do not accurately track ex-
penditures by student type or to the school level. Even where such information is tracked, 
it is not published in ways that are accessible to policymakers trying to pinpoint these 
answers. Similarly, policymakers cannot look to other states for spending comparisons. As 
there are no consistent ways of defining or reporting expenditures driven by student needs, 
the data are not comparable. 
Second, policymakers have not yet sorted out how to channel funds from one govern-
mental level to the next to ultimately reach the intended students. While funds may be 
earmarked by the federal government for poor students, with the objective of boosting 
spending at schools with high concentrations of poverty, the reality is that after filtering 
through state and local allocation streams, the end result may not be as intended.
Third, there is little or no documentation on the different 
options for structuring targeted allocations and how those 
options relate to policy objectives. In other words, alloca-
tions targeted to students with limited English proficiency 
(LEP) might take the form of a fixed dollar amount per LEP 
student, reimbursements for the costs of bilingual education 
services, allocations of staff full time equivalents (FTEs) to high-needs schools, or many 
other forms. Research has not yet demonstrated how these different decisions affect either 
what is ultimately spent per pupil or how well those dollars reach the intended students. 
Meanwhile, policymakers are hungry for solid fiscal estimates on how much it would take 
to get different students to standard. For those interested in infusing more cash into the 
system, an increasingly popular strategy has been to pinpoint levels of adequacy as the 
basis for revising funding legislation.1 Yet, this strategy ignores the fact that we haven’t yet 
definitively identified what mix of resources will get all students (including those with iden-
tifiable needs) to standard. Further, and perhaps more troubling, adequacy claims assume 
that funds will flow as prescribed to the intended students, when all evidence about school 
1. in many states, including Wyoming, Washington, New york, and others, public officials have commissioned 
adequacy studies aimed at determining an “adequate” amount of money needed to get all students to standard.
Policymakers are hungry 
for solid fiscal estimates on 
how much it would take 
to get different students to 
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district finance systems suggests otherwise. In the end, adequacy studies will not provide 
reliable answers to the questions posed here.2
For those who would like to start afresh with a student-weighted allocation system (that 
disburses funds on the basis of student types), clarifying what increments should be applied 
to each student type is an important first step. Yet, in the current state of fiscal alloca-
tion policy, a definitive answer simply cannot exist. One study reports that high-poverty 
students require 25 percent more resources than their peers (Gronberg et al. 2004) while 
another concludes that the figure should be 10 times that (Rothstein 2004). The problem 
here is that we do not yet have an efficient resource allocation system from which we can 
extrapolate that answer in any reliable way.3 
Instead, policymakers are forced to make fiscal policy without information on how much 
is spent on student types, without understanding how allocation policies at different levels 
(federal, state, and local) work either together or in conflict to influence how much is 
spent on different kinds of students at the school level, and without knowing what types of 
policies are better at ensuring that dollars reach students in their intended ways.
While the needs are clear, the issues are complex. This report presents the findings after 
taking on the daunting task of tracing dollars for specific student types from the federal, 
state, and local levels, through different types of policy vehicles, to get at the answers to the 
questions posed here. 
The results point to five policy recommendations for policymakers, each of which repre-
sents a departure in some way from current practice. 
1. Make sure what gets distributed is dollars. 
2. Redesign distribution policies to better channel funds from each governmental 
layer all the way down to schools.
3. Ensure that fund allocations are driven by student needs. 
4. Clean up allocation formulas and other barriers to coherent allocation.
5. Track and report all allocations to schools by student need.
2. Some analysts have “costed out” different services in order to build a spending picture for what might be 
provided to different student types (Baker, Taylor, and Vedlitz 2003). yet these methods of computing the adequate 
costs, while popular in recent state legal activity, are not helpful when budgets are limited and policymakers must 
decide how much of an existing budget should be devoted to one type of student at the expense of another.
3. appendix a provides a synthesis of current studies on implicit and estimated weights.
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While these changes may be difficult, for those struggling to devise coherent fiscal policy 
that targets funds for student needs, the findings in this report indicate that these changes 
are essential.
Navigating a Multi-layered allocation landscape 
The current system of education funding is a maze of intricate formulas from three levels 
of government: federal, state, and local. Each governmental unit has a set of allocation 
policies and spending priorities. 
With funding patterns differing from state to state and district to district, and with spending 
investments buried in budget streams and layers of service delivery, analysis at times can 
be like solving a Sudoku puzzle. Because most education fiscal data are not accounted 
for neatly by student type, data sets for this analysis were created by deconstructing fiscal 
reports and rebuilding expenditures according to those considered non-categorical and 
those intended for a particular student type. 
The objective was to create a data set that reflected spending patterns from each layer of 
government separately and together. With this data set, we asked:
1. How much does any one layer of government contribute in the context of total 
spending increments on each student type? 
2. How does spending per student type vary across schools in a district, across 
districts in a state, and across states?
3. How do different streams of resources work together (or in conflict) to create the 
resulting spending patterns?
4. How do different policies influence spending patterns?
This analysis focused on state-level fiscal data from four states: North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, 
and Washington. In addition, within the four states, we examined fiscal data from 15 school 
districts (3 in each of Ohio and Texas, 4 in North Carolina, and 5 in Washington). Sample 
districts were selected based on meaningful variation in student performance, student 
demographics, and district size.4 Data for this analysis were obtained from federal fiscal 
reports, state departments of education, state regulations regarding allocation, interviews 
4. See appendix B for district selection methods.  
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with district personnel, and local school districts. In a subset of districts, school-level 
spending patterns were used to determine how spending ratios vary among schools. Data 
are from the 2003-2004 school year. 
This report also draws on formal interview data from a com-
plementary study conducted as part of the School Finance 
Redesign Project. Select information from interviews is 
included in this report to provide context for the data. 
The process of tracing, categorizing, and interpreting fiscal policies in these four states 
yielded many insights about how targeted spending works and what is involved in taking 
stock of spending by student type.
Findings
Each layer of Government Has its own agenda
It is well documented that different governmental layers serve different roles in funding 
education. Nationally, the federal share in K-12 revenues is 8.7 percent, states pay an average 
of 48.8 percent, leaving districts to raise an average of 42.5 percent (although the state/local 
share varies substantially across states) (U.S. Department of Education 2002-2003). Figure 
1 shows the extent to which each governmental layer contributes to education spending in 
the four states in this study. In Washington and North Carolina, the state funds the bulk of 
education expenditures, whereas in Ohio and Texas, the state and local governments each 
contribute roughly half of the total. 
The current system of edu-
cation funding is a maze 
of intricate formulas from 
three levels of government: 
federal, state, and local. 
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Figure 1.  Funding Contributions diFFer ACross stAtes 
With the advent of state rankings, most policymakers are now very aware of how the 
average per-pupil contribution from each layer differs across states. Based on national data, 
the total per-pupil revenues in our sample states ranged from $9,870 in Ohio to $7,021 in 
North Carolina, with the different governmental levels contributing different portions for 
each state (see figure 2). 
Less clear are the roles each level of government plays in funding different student types. 
As the next few sections demonstrate, each layer of government has funding systems with 
differing agendas and differing notions of what is needed to get students to standard, all 
built on their own historical precedents. In fact, the diffuse 
nature of education funding means no one governmen-
tal level takes full responsibility for funding any particular 
student type. Each level prioritizes different types of students 
and has different strategies for deploying resources. The 
result is a multi-layered system in which the layers at times 
work at cross-purposes. 
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 F igure 2.  Per-PuPil sPending diFFerenCes ACross stAtes Add uP 
Federal grants bring prescriptions for state and local allocation policy
The federal government’s share of K-12 education spending is intended to boost services 
for some students, experiment with new schooling models, or supplement spending for 
atypical districts (e.g., those in military communities).5 Prior to NCLB, the federal govern-
ment was accused of having a “program for every problem … so much so that there [were] 
hundreds of education programs spread across 39 federal agencies at a cost of $120 billion 
a year” (Bush 2001, 1).  
 With pressure to leverage the federal role for greater change, the No Child Left Behind Act 
of 2001 consolidated some federal programs while establishing performance accountabil-
ity measures designed to ensure that all children succeed in school. Much of the federal 
categorical allocations remained intact, continuing to provide targeted grants to boost 
services for certain types of students. 
5. Federal support for education was consolidated in 1980 with the establishment of the U.S. department of 
Education.  
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The most notable is the federal government’s Title I program (currently a part of NCLB). 
Now more than 40 years in existence, this program allocates over $12 billion per year to 
districts serving high concentrations of children from low-income families. In total, ap-
proximately 41 percent of all federal elementary/secondary education dollars are allocated 
to programs for economically disadvantaged children. 
The federal government also continues to take on a substantial role in funding programs 
for students with disabilities, with 30 percent of federal elementary/secondary education 
funding now allocated toward special education. Other federal initiatives directed toward 
specific student needs constitute a smaller share of the federal elementary/secondary 
education budget; they include funds for vocational education and bilingual education 
(amounting to approximately 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively) (U.S. Department of 
Education 2007).
While this streamlining of federal programs makes it easier to clarify how much the federal 
government spends on each student type, other important issues arise when trying to make 
sense of federal dollars in the context of the full landscape of targeted spending. First, the 
distribution of federal grant dollars to states and districts is driven not only by the enroll-
ment of the intended students, but also by other factors including (1) the concentration of 
the intended population, (2) each state’s level of effort in funding education, (3) each state’s 
policies regarding the distribution of federal dollars, (4) policies requiring some funds to 
be withheld, and finally, (5) previous years’ allocations (Carey 2002). Further, once the 
federal grants reach the district level, district leaders then craft their own policies to deploy 
the resources across schools. 
Second, federal grants bring more than funds. Many come with provisions intended to 
influence spending decisions at the state and local levels. In response to early reports of 
districts spending targeted dollars on general school aid or other unintended purposes, 
amendments were added to tighten up these programs so that they would focus on boosting 
spending for the intended students. The new amendments 
are now the mainstays of most federal education grants and 
specify (1) that state and local funds must be equalized across 
schools in a district before federal dollars can be applied, (2) 
that federal dollars be used exclusively to augment (supple-
ment, not supplant) state and local dollars to make real 
spending higher in schools with eligible children, (3) that 
only certain items can be purchased, and (4) that detailed 
Federal grants bring more 
than funds. Many come 
with provisions intended 
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accounting and auditing take place to ensure compliance. While some research questions 
the effectiveness of these provisions at accomplishing the intended objectives (Roza, Miller, 
and Hill 2005), the fact that these provisions exist demonstrates the role the federal govern-
ment plays in efforts toward targeting resources to higher needs students.
State policies differ in how they target resources 
State education funding, as we know it today, is largely shaped by three decades of equity 
litigation. Starting in the early 1970s, U.S. Supreme Court rulings established that basic 
education funding is primarily a responsibility of states, giving rise to a variety of means 
intended to equalize or to augment basic education funding across districts (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2007).  All states now utilize some basic education funding 
system—the details of which vary substantially from state to 
state—and then augment that with any number of funded 
programs, services, or special allocations that deploy addi-
tional funds to districts. 
In two of the states we studied, Washington and North 
Carolina, basic allocation is handled via the allocation of 
staff, based on the number of enrolled students. In Texas and 
Ohio, local property tax value determines how much state funding each local district will 
receive for public education. In these states, a substantial portion of basic funding is based 
on dollars per student (or daily attendance).6 
The state role in funding services for different student needs has not been clearly defined by 
the courts. Therefore, state allocation policies that fund services for various student needs 
differ enormously in the funding mechanisms they employ, the students they target, the 
conditions they impose, and the level of resources they bring. 
It is only in reading the fine print of each state’s funding formulas that the range of differ-
ences emerges in how states allocate funds for different student types. For example, targeted 
allocations may take the form of per-student allocations, flat grants, competitive grants, 
staff allocations, funds for specific services, reimbursements of costs, cost-sharing, and 
limited eligibility grants (often funding only those districts with high concentrations of a 
6. in Texas, some districts that have higher property values provide a portion of their local taxes to the state to 
be redistributed to other, poorer districts. This system of funding has been challenged in the courts but was in effect 
during the time that these data were collected.
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specific student type). Key differences lie in whether the state allocation (1) works primarily 
to increase spending in the district, (2) restricts the use of funds such that they only benefit 
a certain student type, or (3) specifies exactly what program or service is provided with the 
funds. A portion of Texas’s state allocations works simply to bring more funds to needier 
districts. North Carolina, on the other hand, makes an allocation specifically for alterna-
tive schools (which serve high proportions of high-needs schools), and Ohio pays directly 
for full-day kindergarten as part of its poverty allocation. Washington’s poverty allocation 
requires that the funds be used only for select schools, but doesn’t specify how the money 
is to be used within those schools. 
States also differ in the students that are targeted, often combining different kinds of needs 
for a single allocation. Washington’s primary vehicle for delivering poverty dollars, the 
Learning Assistance Program, drives out dollars on the basis of both poverty and student 
performance.7 And where formulas apply, some states adopt minimum allocations such 
that every school or district receives some minimum allocation (regardless of enrollment 
of the intended beneficiary). As such, understanding the state role in funding different 
student needs necessitates taking stock of the complex and varied nature of state policies.
Local dollars are applied in ways that make tracking investments difficult 
After federal and state governments allocate their earmarked resources, districts are left to 
fill in the gaps. Yet, district allocation policies, including the formulas, practices, and forces 
that drive resource distribution, remain undocumented, unclear, and at times mysterious 
to all but the budget staff. Because districts generally take on the responsibility of con-
verting funds into expenditures for programs or services allocated to schools, it becomes 
difficult to track expenditures by student type and to follow those dollars to schools. 
In most districts, the financial systems are based on a form of fund accounting, intended to 
account for targeted funding from federal and state grants separately, such that the costs for 
any particular student type may be assigned to several different accounts. Budget officials 
assign a set of expenditures that qualify for those restricted funds, and where needed, cover 
the additional costs of the programs or services provided to these students out of the unre-
stricted operating fund. For instance, a district may allocate a few extra instructional aides 
to schools with more complex student populations, yet not identify exactly how many or 
which aides were driven by this rationale, making it impossible to assign costs by student 
7.  Since this analysis took place, Washington changed its policies and now makes separate allocations for 
compensatory education and achievement.  
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need to each school. Further, restricted funds are often budgeted centrally to ensure com-
pliance, making it difficult to determine which schools received which resources. Thus 
the answer to the seemingly simple question of “How much 
is allocated for bilingual education students at Eastside 
Elementary?” may require hours of analysis.
Of course, evidence clearly indicates that the best services 
for disadvantaged students are those that are integrated 
and coherent at the school level. So in a typical district, the 
leaders design the services centrally and then send out the staff allocations accordingly, 
which makes tracking resources below the district level an exercise in futility. The problem 
is that we end up with little sense of whether staffing patterns actually reflect increased 
investments for schools with needy students and if so, to what degree.
In the few districts using some version of weighted student allocation, tracking resources 
that are deployed on the basis of student need is fairly straightforward. In fact, for these 
districts, a simple formula allocates a fixed dollar amount per student type to all schools. 
While this dollar figure may not include targeted state or federal grants, it does clarify how 
local unrestricted dollars are divvied up among schools. Yet, despite the increasing popu-
larity of a weighted student allocation method, most districts still rely on staff allocations 
to drive resources across schools. This means they do not isolate and report the level of 
local or unrestricted dollars being expended on specific student types.
Taking the analysis down to the school level for most districts requires recoding district 
data to identify what portion of unrestricted dollars is expended on services directed at 
each student type. Often, the resources are identifiable by 
the job codes given to the staff assigned to each building. 
For example, bilingual education teachers and bilingual 
education aides constitute the bulk of district expenditures 
for bilingual education. 
Because of the extensive time involved in recoding local 
fiscal data to understand how resources are expended on the 
basis of different student needs, this analysis focuses on a 
subset of districts to get a glimpse of the issues that emerge in investigating how earmarked 
dollars are deployed across schools within districts. Analysis at the school level sought to 
separate those allocations made above and beyond what the district would have allocated 
The problem is that we 
end up with little sense of 
whether staffing patterns 
actually reflect increased 
investments for schools 
with needy students and if 
so, to what degree.
District allocation policies 
remain undocumented, 
unclear,  and at t imes 
mysterious to all but the 
budget staff.  
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to a particular school if the school had no students with identifiable needs. In other words, 
the goal was to isolate those additional resources expended in efforts to address particular 
student needs.8 
Common Metrics are Needed
Each state and district can point to a set of categorical allocations as evidence of investment 
for a type of student. Because programs, services, or staff ratios can mean different things 
in different settings, comparing these investments across states first requires converting 
these figures into a comparable measure. The most common approach—converting cat-
egorical allocations into incremental “expenditures per pupil type”—has the advantage of 
making dollars the common metric. 
However, since each state funds a different portion of the education costs for its districts, 
and each state’s total education spending varies (as part of cost-of-living differences, local 
spending preferences, tax policies, etc.) per-pupil expenditure comparisons do not provide 
a sense of how locales differ in their relative commitments to different student needs.  For 
instance, suppose we have two districts, each of which spends an additional $500 for each 
English Language Learner on top of its basic education expenditures. In the first district, 
the basic education expenditure amounts to $5,000 per pupil whereas in the second district, 
it is $2,500 per pupil. The relative commitment to English Language Learners in the second 
district is much higher, since it spends 20 percent more on bilingual education than on 
regular education students, as compared with 10 percent more in the first district. 
The above example demonstrates that a second measure 
is necessary to communicate the relative portion of each 
funding layer attributed to different student types. So, in 
addition to computing per-pupil spending by student type 
(and governmental layer), allocations were converted into a 
set of implicit “weights.” For this analysis, the incremental 
weight for each student type is computed as a ratio of the incremental per-pupil allocation 
(per student type) to the total non-categorical per-pupil investment.9 In other words, using 
8. This study stops at the school level, as tracking resources to the level of students is impossible in the current 
system.
9. The district analysis includes most operational spending. See appendix C for details. 
A second measure is neces-
sary to communicate the 
relative portion of each 
funding layer attributed to 
different student types.
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the example of the districts mentioned above, if the second district allocates an average of 
20 percent more on English Language Learners than it does on the average student with 
no specialized needs, the weight for English Language Learners in that district is 0.20. 
This information, coupled with the per-pupil allocation by student type, allows for a fuller 
characterization of resource patterns by student type across states and locales. 
Varying definitions of student types complicate the analysis
In adding up the expenditures associated with specified populations, a key detail is the 
definition of student type. For instance, compensatory funds allocated through the federal 
Title I program and some state categorical allocations are designed for disadvantaged 
children. “Disadvantaged” (i.e., at-risk) students may be interpreted as those who live in 
poverty (or qualify for free/reduced-price lunch), perform poorly on state assessment tests, 
move frequently or are homeless (i.e., migrant or transient), qualify for social services, have 
poor attendance records, or meet any number of specific or catch-all definitions. Since 
there are multiple interpretations of compensatory education, these funds can be distrib-
uted in different ways across schools and districts. For this analysis, we have deferred to the 
definition that the district or state in question uses.10 
Resources allocated as “services” pose an ongoing challenge 
As discussed earlier, earmarked resources to help a specific student population are often 
allocations for programs, services, or staff, rather than dollars. For instance, Washington’s 
Bilingual Education Formula allocates one extra certificated staff per 74 qualifying students. 
The state reimburses the district for the actual costs of the 
staff hired (using a state-wide salary scale). The dollar expen-
diture of the allocation ultimately depends on the experience 
of the individuals hired since that dictates where they land 
on the salary schedule. 
In some cases, a cap is set on the percentage of students 
included in a state allocation formula, regardless of how many students are identified 
or served. For example, North Carolina places a cap on students who qualify for special 
education funding at 12.5 percent of the district’s average daily membership. In this case, 
the per-pupil dollar figure depends on how many students are identified as qualifying for 
10. Most states and districts define students as eligible for compensatory education by whether they qualify for 
subsidized lunch.
Earmarked resources to help 
a specific student popula-
tion are often allocations 
for programs, services, or 
staff, rather than dollars. 
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special education and thus involves tracking financial data from states down to districts 
and matching the financial data with district-level demographic data. 
Dollar value of reimbursements is inherently unstable 
Finally, instead of allocating funds directly, some states reimburse districts for expen-
ditures or a portion of expenditures dedicated to serving a specific type of student. For 
example, districts in Washington can apply for a Safety Net Allocation, which reimburs-
es them for the portion of their special education expenditures that exceeds the amount 
allocated by state and federal funds. In this case, additional district expenditure data are 
needed to determine the dollar value of the allocation. Furthermore, as districts choose 
to spend more (or less) each year on the intended student population, the dollar value of 
the reimbursement changes. As a result, the amount the state spends on an allocation as a 
reimbursement cannot be determined at the outset and can prove inherently unstable from 
year to year and from district to district.
Similar Students Receive dissimilar Resources 
After adding up allocations from each layer of government in the sample districts, the fiscal 
data clearly demonstrate that:
Incremental per-pupil spending on any particular student type is highly variable  ■
across districts. 
Spending priorities as indicated by implicit weights (or portions of total spending)  ■
differ substantially as well.
Differences in the base allocation do affect the implicit weights. ■
Spending differs dramatically across districts
We found vast differences in the incremental per-pupil allocations in this data set. The 
differences emerged across districts in different states and among those in the same state. 
For example, one Texas district spent $2,716 per poor student for compensatory education 
above and beyond its basic education expenditure for all students. Another district in Texas 
spent only $880 per pupil on compensatory education. An outlier district in Washington 
spent $11,460 more per poor student, some $10,300 more than any another Washington 
district we studied. 
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There were similar differences for incremental spending on bilingual education, vocational 
education, gifted programs, and special education. Figure 3 shows the range of per-pupil 
expenditures by student type for the 15 districts in our sample. For each student need, the 
range of incremental spending exceeded $3,000 per pupil.
Figure 3.  some distriCts’ inCrementAl AlloCAtions by student  
tyPe Are more thAn three times thAt oF other distriCts
Figure 3 also indicates that per-pupil resources are generally higher for some student 
needs than others. Overall, more is spent on special education students (with a median 
of $6,493 per pupil in our sample) and vocational education (median of $3,123) than on 
compensatory education and bilingual education students (medians of $1,974 and $1,335, 
respectively). The least amount is generally spent on gifted 
education ($612 per pupil), but even these rankings differ 
in some districts. But the question remains: What do these 
per-pupil amounts mean in terms of priorities? 
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Computing implicit weights is a way to clarify a district’s priorities
Budgeting and financial management texts take great care to point out that each organiza-
tion’s allocation patterns are a manifestation of the organization’s priorities, whether those 
priorities are the result of “thoughtful strategic planning process, of the inertia of long 
years of doing approximately the same thing, or of the competing political forces within 
the organization bargaining for shares of the resources” (Lee, Johnson, and Joyce 2004, 2). 
Where districts use a weighted student allocation formula, these allocations are not implicit 
but rather explicit weights—priorities articulated clearly as part of district policy. Since 
most districts do not have a weighted student allocation formula, they do not identify 
weights as explicit. Instead they craft programs to meet their students’ needs in the context 
of resource constraints and mandates for specific services, and then where necessary and 
viable, bolster earmarked funds from the federal and state levels with local funds to cover 
the costs of those programs. 
To understand the relative investment in each student type, we compared the per-pupil 
expenditures by student type to each district’s basic education allocation. Figure 4 shows 
differences in per-pupil dollar amounts and implicit weights across two sample districts. 
Comparing the implicit weights of North Carolina District #1 with those of Texas District 
#3 shows that the Texas district spends proportionately more on bilingual education than 
on poverty—roughly three times more. Conversely, North Carolina District #1 is spending 
almost twice as much on its poverty students than its bilingual students. 
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Figure 4.  dAtA reveAl diFFering dollAr Amounts And Funding 
Priorities For distriCts
If weights = priorities, then priorities differ vastly across districts 
An examination of data from each of the sample districts indicates that some student needs 
emerge as priorities while others are less clear. Spending on students with disabilities tops the 
list of all but two districts’ implicit weights.11 In one, the district spent more per vocational 
education student, and in another relatively wealthy district, poverty students received the 
highest weight. As figure 5 (page 20) shows, among the fifteen districts in this study, higher 
spending weights for special education students are the norm, but patterns regarding pri-
orities for other student types are less clear. In ten districts, vocational education was the 
next highest student weight, funded from 0.17 to 1.71, with a median of 0.43.
11. While the category of special education students includes students with a wide range of disabilities and 
educational needs, this study does not capture those differences. 
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Figure 5.  rAnge oF imPliCit Weights suggests no stAndArd 
PrACtiCe For Portions oF resourCes dediCAted to 
eACh student tyPe
Priorities were even less clear for bilingual and compensatory education. While five districts 
spent a larger increment per limited-English-speaking student than per poverty student, in 
nine districts the weight for poverty students was higher than for bilingual education. 
All but two districts funded gifted students at the lowest weight, with two districts ear-
marking no funds for gifted programs. 
Uneven per-pupil spending, implicit weights, and varying 
priorities confirm what the research suggests: there is no con-
ventional wisdom in place on appropriate costs of programs 
or services for different types of student need. Both weights 
and per-pupil expenditures vary substantially across districts 
and states, such that one district may spend three or more 
times what another does on a particular type of student. 
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Differences in state share of education spending  
impede cross-state comparisons
As described earlier, in two of the states studied here, Ohio and Texas, local dollars make 
up half of total education spending with the state share at only 45 percent and 41 percent, 
respectively (much less than the state share in the other two states). These substantial dif-
ferences in state contributions complicate cross-state comparisons of funding for student 
needs. For example, whereas Washington provides $6,358 per special education student 
above and beyond the $4,895 basic allocation and Ohio provides roughly half that at $3,210 
above its basic allocation, Ohio’s share of the basic allocation is only $2,469. The result is 
that despite the vast differences in per-pupil allocations, both states augment spending by 
the same weight (1.30) for special education. 
The next question that immediately surfaces is whether or not the state should bear the 
burden of funding all the costs associated with special education, or just the same pro-
portion as is applied to basic education.  In either case, under the current finance system, 
comparing state investments by student need across states is virtually impossible when 
each state contributes a substantially different share of what is spent per pupil at the district 
level. Where policymakers continue to think about targeted resources in terms of the 
portion of the total resources available, per-pupil allocations will yield different propor-
tionate investments in different locales. 
disparities Grow as Resources Flow From districts to Schools
While the previous section demonstrates how spending patterns vary across districts, this 
section highlights how those resources are distributed across schools within a subset of 
districts. 
Efforts to equalize funding fall short at the school level
For decades, resource equity investigations stopped at the district door, in large part 
because district fiscal accounting practices made analysis of spending patterns by schools 
impossible. In recent years, as fiscal accounting has changed and accountability reforms 
have put the spotlight on school-level student performance, school-level equity questions 
have surfaced, namely, “Are district allocation policies treating all schools appropriately 
given their mix of students?”
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Several studies give cause for concern by demonstrating that spending differences among 
schools within districts at times exceed spending differences across districts (e.g., Hertert 
1995; Roza, Guin, Gross, and DeBurgomaster 2007). Such inequities across schools cannot 
be blamed on the tax base or access to resources because individual schools receive only 
what the district gives them by way of its allocation policies. As mentioned above, district 
leaders assign staff to schools, often with additional allocations to schools with higher 
student needs, or to schools with unique programs or characteristics (e.g., small, magnet, 
alternative, redesign). The total allocation to each school is effectively what it costs the 
district for the staff and other resources applied to each school. Allocations can vary with 
each school’s staff experience because more experienced teachers are paid more by the 
district. Costs can vary by school size as per-school allocations (for librarians, counselors, 
etc.) cost more per pupil in small schools. And clearly costs increase when some schools 
garner additional staff for magnet or other unique programs. Lastly, schools that receive 
targeted allocations as a result of their identified student needs pose higher costs—and it is 
these “incremental” costs that this study investigates. But, without accurate accounting of 
school-level allocations, district leaders are not aware of how investments by student type 
vary across schools.
Given these data challenges, this analysis of how district 
spending patterns translate to implicit weights at the school 
level included only the two districts with uniquely detailed 
school-level expenditure reporting. As a result, while the 
patterns found here illuminate key issues in how targeted 
dollars move to the school level, these patterns may not fully illuminate issues that exist 
elsewhere in districts lacking school-level spending detail. That said, the findings here 
are important in that they show how the variation across student-need categories within 
districts can be much greater than the variation across districts. 
Table 1 portrays the extent to which implicit weights for different student types vary across 
elementary schools in Texas District #3. For example, bilingual weights range from 0.00 to 
223.68, with a median of 1.20. Investigation of outliers suggests that the highest bilingual 
education weights appeared in schools with relatively few bilingual education students, 
increasing the per-pupil cost of assigned bilingual staff. 
Ignoring outliers and instead focusing on implicit weights for schools at the 5th and 95th 
percentile, it is clear that the range in weights is still much higher among schools within a 
district than among districts within a state. The range for bilingual education, for instance, 
The var iat ion across 
student-need categories 
within districts can be 
much greater than the vari-
ation across districts.  
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was between 0.40 and 4.57. Implicit poverty weights in some schools were more than 10 
times the implicit weights in other schools. 
tAble 1.  rAnge oF sPending Weights ACross sChools exCeeds 
rAnges Found ACross distriCts
Across schools in texas district #3
Compensatory 
Education
Special  
Education
Bilingual 
Education
Minimum 0.02 0.63 0.00
5th Percentile 0.08 1.05 0.40
Median 0.31 2.12 1.20
95th Percentile 0.85 4.40 4.57
Maximum 11.52 7.18 223.68
 
Across texas districts
Compensatory 
Education
Special 
Education
Bilingual 
Education
Minimum 0.33 2.17 0.30
Maximum 1.27 3.32 0.91
Spending variations lack apparent rationale
The data in table 1 demonstrate that the implicit weight on any student type can vary 
substantially from school to school in the same district. The question that comes imme-
diately to mind is, “Why do districts allocate more to some schools than others?” One 
might suspect that districts allocate more to schools with greater concentrations of need. 
To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship between concentrations of poverty 
and poverty weights across schools in Texas District #1. Figure 6 shows implicit poverty 
weights arranged by each elementary school’s percentage 
of poverty, suggesting that while concentration of poverty 
does explain some of the variation, the patterns are not what 
would be expected. 
The question that comes 
immediately to mind is, 
“Why do districts allocate 
more to some schools than 
others?” 
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Figure 6.  PAtterns oF imPliCit Poverty Weights do not APPeAr 
to CorresPond With need
In this district, implicit poverty weights are generally higher for the schools with the highest 
concentrations of poverty. Many schools with 80 percent or more poverty students receive 
30 percent or more per-pupil funds for these students than for regular students. However, 
implicit weights are even higher for some of the schools with the lowest poverty levels.12 
One might suspect that other justifiable rationales drive differences in per-pupil spending 
levels for each student type across schools. For instance, 
districts may allocate more money to schools with lower 
test scores, to smaller schools (with higher marginal costs), 
or to schools where other student needs (like transience or 
homelessness) add to the challenges at hand. In other words, 
differences in targeted spending by student type from school 
to school might follow some justifiable pattern not apparent 
in these data. 
12.  Note that four schools were outliers in this data set, with compensatory weights greater than 0.90 (ranging 
from 1.22 to 3.37).  all of these schools had concentrations of poverty of less than 6 percent.  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Fraction of Poverty
C
om
pe
ns
at
or
y 
W
ei
gh
ts
 fo
r S
ch
oo
ls 
in
 T
ex
as
 D
ist
ric
t #
1
Significant unexplained 
variation exists in spending 
levels among schools, even 
after taking into account 
a multitude of identifi-
able school and student 
characteristics.
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The research on intradistrict spending patterns, while not definitive, questions the existence 
of such a rationale. One study on intradistrict spending patterns in Texas found that only 
33 percent of the variation in per-pupil allocations (including categorical dollars) could 
be explained by identifiable school characteristics, including student performance (Roza, 
Guin, Gross, and DeBurgomaster 2007). Other studies of spending patterns among urban 
schools found similar results, namely, that significant unexplained variation exists in 
spending levels among schools, even after taking into account a multitude of identifiable 
school and student characteristics (Hertert 1995).
 While this study does not directly investigate the relationship between implicit weights and 
school characteristics, later sections describe some of the ways in which current policies 
contribute to the variations in spending by student type.
differences in Base Can Work against Targeted allocations
The idea behind targeted allocations is that they provide “extra” funds to students that need 
“extra” resources in order to perform. However, as figure 7 demonstrates, even at the level 
of schools within districts, one cannot assume that targeted funds layer on top of a base 
allocation that is independent of the targeted funds. In this district, schools with fewer 
poverty students receive a larger base allocation ($3,005 vs. $2,369 per pupil in the schools 
with higher poverty). Federal Title I dollars that do indeed disproportionately land on 
higher-needs students do not fully compensate for the inequities in the base allocation.
For the federal government, these patterns in base allocations work directly counter to their 
efforts to use funds to close the achievement gap. Where districts offset federal funds by 
disproportionately spending more discretionary funds on wealthier schools, the federally 
targeted dollars cannot possibly have the intended effect of boosting spending and student 
performance among the high-poverty schools. Put more simply, when the federal govern-
ment invests funds to ensure that the highest-poverty schools have more resources, we find 
local governments counteracting this investment by directing their resources dispropor-
tionately to lower-poverty schools.
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Figure 7.  FederAlly tArgeted dollArs lAyer onto An uneven 
bAse Among sChools Within distriCt #1 
allocations are driven by More Than Performance
In the process of tracing and coding expenditures by source and student type, many ex-
planations for the uneven spending patterns emerged. While many allocation policies 
originate with an interest in providing greater services for needy students, other factors 
influence policy implementation. 
This section describes three ways in which targeted allocation policies create messy and 
sometimes unintended spending patterns:
Funds originating at different levels are not predictive of how much is ultimately  ■
dedicated to a particular student type.
Seemingly minor details of allocation formulas have big consequences for spending  ■
patterns. 
Different motivations influence implementation of targeted allocations. ■
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Local policy dampens the effect of targeted federal and state funds 
Well-intentioned federal and state targeted allocations are generally aimed at either 
boosting spending on a specific student type, or relieving districts of some of the financial 
burden of serving high-cost students. For instance, the federal Title I program is designed 
to compel districts to spend more on students from high-poverty backgrounds as part of 
a federal initiative to limit the long-term effects of poverty on children. Federal special 
education allocations, on the other hand, are intended to relieve districts from the typical 
burden imposed by meeting the needs of students with disabilities.
The concern, however, is that in a system with multiple sources of funding, policies that 
target resources across student types lack coordination or alignment across levels of gov-
ernment. One way to investigate this concern is to consider 
the sum of all the sources and its impact on spending for 
each student type. 
What happens when you put all funds from all sources for 
one particular type of student together to get a cumulative 
weight?  We found little equity in the distribution of weights 
for different student types across districts and schools. 
Furthermore, by breaking out the spending by source, we found instances where the sum 
of the parts had more variation than the parts themselves. 
For instance, figure 8a shows how the weights for the state portion of special education 
funds are fairly consistent across Washington districts. Different districts, however, contrib-
ute local money at different ratios, resulting in variation in the implicit weight (see figure 
8b). While District #2 spent 166 percent (or $8,465 per pupil) more on a special education 
student, District #1, at 91 percent (or $4,379 per pupil), spent roughly half that. Despite 
a relatively even distribution of state special education resources (and total education 
resources), Washington districts spent substantially different amounts on students with 
disabilities. The result is that the equitably distributed state investment was not predictive 
of the overall investment in special education seen at the district level, nor was it effective 
in equalizing the resources available for these students. 
In a system with multiple 
sources of funding, policies 
that target resources across 
student types lack coordi-
nation or alignment across 
levels of government.  
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Figures 8A And 8b.  desPite equitAble stAte AlloCAtions 
For sPeCiAl eduCAtion, students With 
disAbilities reCeive vAstly disPArAte 
resourCes ACross distriCts
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Figure 9.  loCAl investments ChAnge the eFFeCt oF FederAl 
investments 
In a different example, Ohio districts received a modest amount from the federal government 
for bilingual education, but the state did not allocate funds specifically for this purpose. As 
can be seen in figure 9, districts augmented federal bilingual dollars at different levels. In 
total, District #3 allocated 7 percent more for bilingual education students (amounting to 
$533 per bilingual education student), whereas District #2’s implicit weight, at 66 percent 
more or $4,008 per bilingual student, was seven times more. Again, different local allo-
cation policies dramatically altered the impact that federal investment had on different 
districts. If federal lawmakers intended that federally targeted bilingual education alloca-
tions level the playing field for these students, the result is anything but that. 
In the sample districts, we found similar patterns when we examined how resources 
from different sources affected spending at each school in a district. Figure 10 shows how 
federal, state, and local resources influenced spending for poverty students across elemen-
tary schools in Texas District #1. 
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Figure 10.  loCAl And stAte investments thWArt FederAl 
Priorities to boost sPending For highest 
ConCentrAtions oF Poverty
Where federal dollars are concentrated primarily on schools with higher proportions of 
students in poverty, state and local targeted dollars are distributed in larger proportions 
to lower-poverty schools (often to ensure that all schools receive some benefit). Federally 
targeted funds, in this case, are not effective at providing 
the highest-poverty schools with a leg up, as intended. As 
was found in patterns on base allocations, when the federal 
government invests funds to ensure that the highest-poverty 
schools have more resources, local governments counteract 
this investment. In effect, local intentions work to ensure 
that all schools (regardless of poverty level) benefit in some 
way from all allocations (including poverty allocations). 
For federal lawmakers, targeting funds becomes part of a much larger investment at the 
state and local levels. And since states and districts spend their resources differently, federal 
dollars get combined with other funds at different rates to affect spending by student type. 
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Seemingly minor details can have big unintended consequences
In sifting through federal, state, and local allocations that target resources to different 
student types, one can immediately see how allocation formula details play an important 
role in determining ultimate spending levels across districts and schools. Targeted al-
locations differ enormously, with some allocating dollars and others allocating staff or 
programs. Table 2 shows some of the ways allocations are made.
tAble 2.  exAmPles oF AlloCAtion detAils
For urban districts with many different categorical allocations, the differing details fuel an 
entire industry intended to help with compliance. But additionally, the details are part of 
the reason for the very different spending patterns that emerge across states. In Texas, for 
instance, special education funding is weighted by disability type, and there is no cap on 
the number of students who can qualify, so it comes as no surprise that the Texas districts 
spend proportionately more on special education students than do districts in other states. 
North Carolina and Washington, on the other hand, provide a flat rate per student, regard-
less of disability, and cap the percentage of students who can be funded. These formula 
differences influence actual amounts allocated to (and eventually spent on) individual 
students. North Carolina and Washington districts have implicit weights less than 1.66, 
whereas the weights in Texas range from 2.17 to 3.32. 13 
13. State special education allocation weights: North Carolina (0.80), ohio (0.29 – 4.7), Texas (1.1 – 5), and 
Washington (0.93) 
types of targeted Allocations
Lump sum grants ■
Per pupil type ■
Per fixed (or capped)  ■
percentage of all pupils 
Per school ■
Per staff (allocations for training) ■
Allocations for programs or  ■
services (e.g., professional devel-
opment, reduced class size)
Allocations for staff (e.g.,   ■
instructional aides, coaches)
Reimbursements for expenditures ■
types of restrictions
Which schools are eligible ■
Which students are eligible ■
What objects can be purchased  ■
(and at what amounts)
What services are covered ■
How non-grant dollars are expended   ■
(i.e., requires match, compara-
bility, non-supplanting, etc.)
Separate accounting ■
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Figure 11.  AlloCAtion FormulAs CAn CreAte unintended inequities
Some targeted allocations include minimum grants for districts with small proportions 
of the targeted student type. Washington’s compensatory allocation formula ensures that 
even the wealthier districts (e.g., Washington District #3) receive some minimum level of 
compensatory funds, that when spread over their very small portions of poverty students, 
amount to incredibly high implicit compensatory weights (see figure 11). 
Allocations for programs, staff, and services tend to be lumpier allocations than per-pupil 
allotments, as they dictate the flow of staff full-time equivalents instead of dollars. Similarly, 
requirements that state or federal allocations not be comingled with other expenditures 
can create the incentive to consolidate the administration of resources in a central de-
partment or concentrate the targeted resources on a subset of schools, if only for ease of 
accounting. 
In the case of federally funded poverty allocations (Title I), the details embedded in the 
comparability provisions render the intent of the provisions essentially meaningless (Roza, 
Miller, and Hill 2005). While the federal law is designed to require districts to evenly 
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distribute state and local dollars before applying the federally targeted funds, as demon-
strated in figure 11 above, the federal legislation is not having its intended effect in some 
districts. 
Other forces shape implicit weights
While closing the achievement gap is viewed a primary reason for providing targeted 
resources to specific student groups, interviews with district and state personnel reveal 
other factors affecting how much is spent on each student type. Some of these factors 
include:
Labor contracts. ■  Labor contracts influence costs when provisions dictate elements 
of service delivery. For example, in some districts, contract provisions specify 
maximum student-teacher ratios for pull-out services.
Low-needs schools. ■  Schools with few student needs often pressure the district for 
equivalent services, such as full-day kindergarten, the placement of instructional 
assistants, and other resources paid for with targeted dollars.
Fear of litigation. ■  Some district leaders augment services as a way of heading off 
the threat of legal challenges to special education services—now the most litigated 
element of K-12 education. District leaders worried about the high costs of special 
education litigation would rather spend more on these services than on legal 
defense.
Differing strategies and services. ■  Districts vary in the strategies they use to serve 
different student types. While some districts use inclusion, others provide pull-out 
programs that require higher levels of funding. Additionally, district leaders worry 
that providing superior services in their district would serve to draw in greater 
portions of high-needs students.
Differing marginal costs. ■  In some cases, high concentrations of one type of 
student need are linked to lower marginal costs (e.g., bilingual education), where 
in others, the high concentrations have the opposite effect on spending (e.g., levels 
of poverty). 
Special interest groups. ■  Special interest groups lobby policymakers for increased 
resources for specific student types. In Texas, for example, the vocational education 
constituency is known for its influence on allocations for eligible students. 
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Student identification. ■  A state leader worried about incentives for districts to 
classify students as needing bilingual education services because more bilingual 
education students bring in more state funds. On the other hand, where there 
are formulas that cap special education allocations, districts complain that when 
parents themselves can influence identification with their own doctor’s reports, 
the caps unduly limit the resources that districts receive for students over which 
they have little or no say in identifying as needing services.
This sampling of factors demonstrates that allocation policies exist in a complex environ-
ment of many different forces that can and do influence resource patterns across student 
types.  The next section offers several recommendations for policymakers, as they continue 
to navigate this complex policy arena in their efforts to target resources toward better 
student performance of specific student types.
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Recommendation:  
Redesign Distribution and  
Resource Reporting Protocols
These findings point to major problems in the current manner of allocating and tracking 
funds for student needs. The exact nature of the problems differs somewhat from locale 
to locale, but what seems persistent is the notion that differences in agendas, details of 
formulas, local political forces, and other factors work at cross-purposes such that the 
current system of channeling targeted dollars to high-needs students is anything but 
intentional. 
For policymakers trying to determine the “right” amount to allocate per student type, the 
existing information provides little guidance. With spending levels and allocation mech-
anisms varying substantially across settings, it is difficult 
to extract broad conclusions about levels of spending and 
student performance. And until we have a better-functioning 
allocation system, we cannot possibly begin to investigate the 
level of optimal spending necessary for the desired result. 
We recommend redesigning distribution and resource 
reporting protocols as a way to more efficiently and effectively align and track resources 
with student needs. Because of the different governmental layers involved, the recom-
mendations propose changes intended to influence the process that guides how resources 
trickle down to schools. In other words, making targeted allocations serve their purpose 
means addressing policies at every level of government. Specifically, we recommend the 
changes detailed below. 
Make Sure That What Gets distributed is dollars
Much of the unintended variation in spending arises when state and district policymakers 
convert dollars into purchased resources (e.g., staff, services, program access, etc.) before 
allocating them. Sending out one staff member per school, a specialist per set of schools, 
or the costs of programs or services does not allow for equitable distribution of dollar 
Making targeted alloca-
tions serve their purpose 
means  address ing 
po l i c i e s  at  every  l eve l 
o f  government . 
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resources. When state lawmakers prescribe how resources get used, there is little sense of 
how implementation at the local level can affect what gets spent at each school. Most im-
portantly, allocating programs or services can have the effect of supplanting other resources 
that would have already been expended on the intended students. 
Further, when funding sources distribute funds (instead of purchased resources) schools 
can combine resources from different sources to provide a more comprehensive and inte-
grated program for their students. For instance, where schools effectively receive resources 
from three different sources for bilingual education, and each delivers a different type of 
purchased items (one provides aides, another provides funds for specialists, and a third 
provides access to professional development), it becomes unlikely that the school will be 
able to integrate these resources to provide a coherent program for these students. 
It is important to note that this recommendation differs substantively from recently 
popular initiatives to design allocation policies around adequacy studies that cost out the 
purchased resources. These state-level efforts typically have the effect of identifying the mix 
of purchased resources that some believe schools ought to have and then distributing those 
purchased items instead of delivering dollars. The clear problem brought to the fore in this 
report is that when different governmental layers are involved in determining the mix of 
purchased resources for schools, the result is an inequitable, unintentional, and uncoordi-
nated distribution of resources.
While delivering resources in the form of dollars is often accompanied by policies intended 
to give schools more flexibility in resource use, that recommendation is not made explicitly 
here. Certainly decisions about how resources are used should be tailored to the needs of 
students at each school, but whether those decisions are made by school or district personnel 
should depend on the accountability systems in place and the capabilities of each.
Redesign distribution Policies to Better Channel Funds From Each 
Governmental layer all the Way down to Schools
Allocation is a multi-step process. Policymakers should craft policies that ensure that dollar 
allocations are accounted for as dollar allocations down to the school level. As the data 
here indicate, different objectives at the district level can work to alter spending priorities 
according to local pressures, which can at times work against the interests of those students 
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most in need of extra resources. Targeted allocations at the federal and school levels, then, 
should come with accounting requirements that track spending to each school building. 
Intergovernmental coordination is more feasible when schools are the ultimate beneficiary 
of each allocation.
Specifically, efficient and intentional resource allocation must include district mechanisms 
to distribute targeted resources directly to schools. Much of the spending variation across 
schools occurs when factors present at the district level shape allocations as they get redis-
tributed across schools. In addition, without the means by which resources can be passed 
on to the school level, many districts create central departments for each of their student 
needs, further removing funds from the level at which they impact students. As a result, 
distribution policies must be redesigned around delivering resources to schools (vs. to in-
termediate units, such as districts, departments, and the like). One clear option is to adopt 
student-based allocation systems (often called “weighted student funding” or WSF) as the 
mechanism for deploying targeted and non-targeted resources across schools. With in-
creasing numbers of districts and states opting for WSF, there is now great precedent for 
this policy option. 
Ensure That Funds are deployed as a Function of Student Needs
Implementing a more effective funding system for different student types requires a clear 
method for identifying the students (not the schools, staff, or programs) who warrant 
additional services. Targeted funding should flow out as a function of student character-
istics, not school characteristics, student participation in programs, or staff interest. As 
data presented here indicate, state and district level allocations, while intended to address 
identified student needs, are often deployed in such ways that they do not effectively target 
their intended students.
This standard creates new demands on the system for student identification and definition 
of student need.  Given the different motivations to over- or under-identify students, the 
system will need clarity about where responsibility lies with identifying students and how 
the definition of need plays a role in funding. 
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Clean Up allocation Formulas and other Barriers to Coherent allocation
Many of the problems of existing allocations lie in the allocation details. Details on 
minimums, maximums, reimbursements, foundation amounts, matching costs, and the 
like create inherent inefficiencies that hamper attempts at the local level to use funds to 
best meet the needs of the students. For instance, as was demonstrated in this report, a 
state poverty allocation that provides some minimum funding level to all districts has the 
effect of allocating extremely high targeted per-pupil allocations to districts with almost no 
poverty. The result is that scarce poverty funds are not focused on the most needy students, 
but rather the opposite. Further, formula details invite efforts at gaming the system, which 
also works to distort spending among student needs. 
Part of cleaning up the details necessitates making decisions about if and how marginal 
costs vary with different concentrations of student need. As has been long understood, 
there are greater needs associated with concentrations of poverty, and thus higher percent-
ages of poverty are often associated with increases in marginal costs. Bilingual and special 
education, however, are at times viewed as the opposite. Educating one deaf student costs 
much more per student than educating two, when the costs of the specialists or services 
can be split across two students. So as targeted dollars are deployed in their “dollar” form, 
there is a need to understand how marginal costs are affected by different concentrations of 
student need. In either case, strict pupil-based formulas should guide the allocations, and 
special provisions for individual districts and schools should be avoided. 
Further, for some districts, labor contract provisions, levy mandates, and other forces 
play a role in how resources are used. When these forces create barriers to targeting dollar 
allocations by student type to schools, cleaning up the details means addressing some of 
these barriers. For instance, labor policies that dictate how high-needs students are served 
(i.e., requirements for teacher aides in classes with bilingual education students) have the 
effect of structuring allocations that may conflict with efforts to drive funds on the basis of 
student needs.
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Track and Report all allocations to Schools by Student Need
Policymakers must have access to the amount of funding coming from each level of gov-
ernment in order to make weights effective at addressing needs across student type. As the 
data clearly indicate, each level of government cannot assume that the portion of funds it 
allocates for a particular student need (say 20 percent for bilingual education students) will 
be the same portion that is ultimately spent at the school level. Even more problematic, 
states and districts cannot be sure that local dollars will be used to offset targeted alloca-
tions from higher governmental levels. 
Taking stock of targeted allocations means comparing targeted funds to the basic education 
funds intended for all students, including those generated by all levels of government. But 
being able to make these comparisons, given the current state of allocation and accounting 
systems, is an arduous task. As mentioned above, reporting systems that are able to track 
funds from all sources by student type down to the school level will need to be developed. 
Not only will these data shed light on issues of (in)equity, but they will also give policymak-
ers at all levels the much needed information on the total amounts being spent. Perhaps 
most importantly, transparency around fiscal allocations is critical to policymakers’ efforts 
to ensure comparability in base allocations and fairness in targeted allocations. 
For federal and state policymakers, clear data on total allocations can ensure that targeted 
resources do indeed have the effect of augmenting resources for the most needy schools. 
For students, parents, community members, and special interest groups, tracking alloca-
tions to schools forces open and public scrutiny of allocation decisions, many of which are 
currently indiscernible.
To clarify, what this report proposes is improved tracking of allocations down to the school 
level versus calling for additional school-based expenditure data. The difference is that 
tracking allocations to the school level shows what funds are delivered to each school and 
on what basis (untargeted or driven by student need). Expenditure data, in contrast, shows 
how the funds are converted into purchased resources, and while relevant, tracking ex-
penditure data by fund source makes it difficult for schools to combine resources from 
different sources for a single purpose. Lastly, while this recommendation proposes tracking 
revenues to the school level, it does not go the next step of accounting for how resources are 
deployed across individual students. 
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That said, one should not underestimate the complexity of changing reporting practices in 
any education system. State reporting practices are intertwined with policies on compli-
ance, personnel, funding, and other functions, which make any changes burdensome and 
costly. However, fundamental to solutions in resource allocation policy is a transparent 
fiscal allocation system that tracks dollars by student type to each school. 
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Conclusion
The idea of funding weights for different types of students is based on the assumption 
that different students require different levels of resources to make similar academic gains. 
And while closing the achievement gap is viewed as the primary reason for providing 
student weights, this study suggests that there is no clear standard for providing additional 
resources and that current allocations may not be getting to the intended student groups. 
As many districts and some states move to student-based budgeting, policymakers will 
be forced to make explicit decisions about how much to spend on each student type. This 
report highlights the need for more clarity on how much funding is earmarked for student 
needs. It also demonstrates that allocation and reporting policies need to be modified in 
order to ensure that different student types actually receive their intended funding. 
While this report does establish a list of implicit spending weights with relative contribu-
tions from each government layer, it does not propose any “standard” weights. Rather, as 
is demonstrated here, research and policy are far from clarifying the link between services, 
spending levels, and student performance. In fact, until weights are implemented in ways 
that are more effective, we cannot yet begin to know the “right” amount. And as the system 
does a better job of aligning the funding with student needs, we should expect policy-
makers to adjust funding levels as they keep an eye on the achievement of students with 
different learning needs. 
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Appendix A.  
Weight Studies 
implicit Weight studies
Compensatory 
education
bilingual 
education
gifted & 
talented
special 
education
vocational 
education
Chambers, 
Parrish, and 
Harr (2004)
0.90, 1.08 
Baker and 
Friedman-Nimz 
(2003)
0 – 0.33
Baker and 
McIntire (2003) <0.01 – >0.30
Carey (2002) 0 – 0.525mean=0.15
Baker and 
Markham (2002) 0 – 1.29
Baker (2001) 0.001 – 1.91 0 – 1.30 0 – 0.22
Klein (2001) 0.05 – 0.60 
estimated Weight studies
Compensatory 
education
bilingual 
education
gifted & 
talented
special 
education
vocational 
education
Duncombe and 
Yinger (2004) 1.22 – 1.67 1.01 – 1.42 2.05 – 2.64
Baker and 
Friedman-Nimz 
(2003)
0.30 – 0.60
Maryland 
Commission 
on Education 
Finance, Equity 
and Excellence 
(2002)
1.39
Duncombe 
(2002)
0.97 1.09
Reschovsky and 
Imazeki (1997) 1.59
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Appendix B.  
State and District Selection Methods
Districts in this analysis represent a subset of districts from other School Finance Redesign 
Project studies (De Wys, Bowen, Demeritt, and Adams 2008a; De Wys, Bowen, Demeritt, 
and Adams 2008b; Hansen, Ikemoto, Marsh, and Barney 2007; Hansen, Marsh, Ikemoto, 
and Barney 2007). In each of four states—North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Washington—
districts were selected using the following criteria:
A district with a reputation for educational innovation;   ■
A district that appeared to be “beating-the-odds” academically;   ■
A district with similar characteristics to the “beating-the-odds” district but with  ■
relatively low performance;   
A high-performing district; and ■
A rural district that appeared be performing better than predicted (Ohio and  ■
Washington only).  
Districts were selected as “innovative” based on their reputation for innovative opera-
tions. Absolute performance on state standardized tests defined high-performing districts. 
Researchers used an adjusted performance measures (APM) method to pick the matched 
pairs. After selecting candidate districts, researchers consulted with state officials to ensure 
that potential study districts did not suffer from unusual circumstances, such as admin-
istrator malfeasance, teacher strikes, state takeover, or excessive recent superintendent 
turnover.
To identify districts that appear to be performing better or worse than expected, research-
ers regressed a measure of student performance on state standardized tests against the 
following variables: percent free/reduced-price lunch (FRPL), percent African American, 
percent Native American, percent Asian, percent Hispanic, district enrollment, per-pupil 
expenditures, and urban/rural status. Researchers then sorted the districts by quartiles 
of the percentage of students on free/reduced-price lunch and the percentage of racial/
ethnic minority students. They used these quartile rankings to further narrow the list of 
potential districts by excluding districts that did not have higher than state median per-
centages of students on free/reduced-price lunch and higher than median percentages 
of minority students. Using this short list of sorted districts, researchers visually identi-
fied pairs of districts in each state with similar student demographics (poverty, minority 
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concentrations), enrollments, and per-pupil expenditures, but with one member of the 
pair having a standardized residual of greater than 0.25 and the other having a standard-
ized residual of less than -0.25 (i.e., with one member having an APM more than 0.25 
standard deviations above the expected value and the other having an APM more than 0.25 
standard deviations below the expected value). 
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Appendix C.  
Included and Excluded Expenditure  
Categories and Revenue Sources
included expenditure Categories excluded expenditure Categories
Teacher salaries ■
Administrative salaries ■
Administrative expenditures ■
Student support services ■
Books / media expenditures ■
Academic support expenditures ■
Professional development ■
Curriculum ■
Academic after-school program expenses ■
Food services ■
Security services ■
Capital expenses ■
Groundskeeping ■
Utilities ■
Student activities ■
Athletics ■
Extracurricular activities (non-academic) ■
Pre-kindergarten programs ■
Adult education ■
Transportation expenses (except special  ■
education)
Facilities expenses ■
included revenue sources excluded revenue sources
Federal tax revenue ■
State tax revenue ■
Local tax revenue ■
Intermediate governmental revenue ■
Debt services ■
Competitive grants ■
Grants targeted towards other categorical  ■
students (migrant, homeless, Native 
American)
Nongovernmental funding sources ■
Private grants ■
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Appendix D.  
State and District Data 
tAble A.  distriCt desCriPtives
district
Per-Pupil 
expend
% FrPl
% non- 
White
% nA
% 
Asian
% 
black
% 
hisp
% 
White
locale
NC #1 $6,296 46% 46% 0% 0% 39% 5% 54% Rural, inside CBSA/MSA
NC #2 $6,542 30% 12% 0% 1% 7% 3% 88% Urban fringe of mid-size city
NC #3 $6,979 38% 52% 1% 4% 43% 4% 48% Mid-size city
NC #4 $7,156 37% 55% 1% 4% 44% 7% 45% Large city
OH #1 $10,889 77% 81% 0% 1% 71% 9% 19% Large city
OH #2 $10,395 2% 13% 0% 7% 7% 1% 87% Urban fringe of large city
OH #3 $10,981 62% 74% 0% 1% 72% 1% 26% Large city
TX #1 $7,551 50% 68% 0% 3% 15% 50% 32% Large city
TX #2 $5,785 57% 76% 0% 3% 6% 67% 24% Urban fringe of large city
TX #3 $7,589 73% 90% 0% 3% 31% 56% 10% Large city
WA #1 $8,335 87% 93% 15% 0% 0% 77% 7% Urban fringe of mid-size city
WA #2 $9,171 40% 60% 3% 23% 23% 11% 40% Large city
WA #3 $7,460 1% 19% 0% 16% 1% 2% 81% Urban fringe of large city
WA #4 $7,222 40% 16% 7% 1% 1% 6% 84% Mid-size city
WA #5 $7,970 36% 17% 3% 3% 2% 9% 83% Mid-size city
tAble b.  FederAl exPenditure dAtA 
Federal Per-Pupil Spending North Carolina Texas Ohio Washington
Basic Education $0 $8 $9 $10
Compensatory Education $765 $690 $1,088 $692
Special Education $1,412 $1,670 $1,656 $1,634
Vocational Education $123 $111 $390 $406
Bilingual Education $125 $123 $280 $136
Gifted Education $0 $0 $0 $0
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tAble C.  stAte Per-PuPil exPenditure And Weight by Funding CAtegory
total Per-Pupil 
spending
north Carolina texas ohio Washington
Basic Education $3,382 $2,408 $2,469 $4,895
Compensatory Education $1,115 $1,183 $1,721 $1,435
Special Education $3,944 $4,962 $3,210 $6,358
Vocational Education $1,157 $845 $816 $4,625
Bilingual Education $590 $373 $280 $1,037
Gifted Education $335 $188 $114 $583
total Weight north Carolina texas ohio Washington
Compensatory Education 0.33 0.49 0.70 0.29
Special Education 1.17 2.06 1.30 1.30
Vocational Education 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.94
Bilingual Education 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.21
Gifted Education 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.12
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tAble d.  distriCt Per-PuPil exPenditure And Weight by sourCe And Funding 
CAtegory
basic education Federal state local Weight
vocational 
education
Federal state local Weight
NC District #1 $0 $3,406 $1,099 1.00 NC District #1 $77 $960 $4 0.23
NC District #2 $0 $3,410 $866 1.00 NC District #2 $81 $996 $99 0.27
NC District #3 $0 $3,139 $1,631 1.00 NC District #3 $78 $963 $98 0.24
NC District #4 $0 $2,976 $1,276 1.00 NC District #4 $77 $1,073 $171 0.31
OH District #1 $0 $6,048 1.00 OH District #1 $987 $4,329 0.88
OH District #2 $0 $7,456 1.00 OH District #2 $0 $6,572 0.88
OH District #3 $0 $7,766 1.00 OH District #3 $550 $2,342 0.37
TX District #1 $6 $3,469 1.00 TX District #1 $60 $546 0.17
TX District #2 $39 $2,106 1.00 TX District #2 $107 $816 0.43
TX District #3 $21 $2,621 1.00 TX District #3 $74 $804 0.33
WA District #1 $198 $4,242 $367 1.00 WA District #1 $551 $7,080 $612 1.71
WA District #2 $39 $3,805 $1,254 1.00 WA District #2 $295 $4,020 $14 0.85
WA District #3 $4 $3,886 $1,858 1.00 WA District #3 $137 $2,494 $1,199 0.67
WA District #4 $29 $3,965 $983 1.00 WA District #4 $175 $3,985 $0 0.84
WA District #5 $19 $3,878 $1,268 1.00 WA District #5 $228 $3,151 $1,041 0.86
Compensatory education Federal state local Weight
bilingual 
education
Federal state local Weight
NC District #1 $492 $396 $0 0.20 NC District #1 $136 $396 $0 0.12
NC District #2 $593 $364 $195 0.27 NC District #2 $93 $387 $23 0.12
NC District #3 $477 $282 $56 0.17 NC District #3 $98 $442 $78 0.13
NC District #4 $378 $350 $61 0.19 NC District #4 $88 $347 $48 0.11
OH District #1 $735 $884 0.27 OH District #1 $383 $3,625 0.66
OH District #2 $600 $0 0.08 OH District #2 $286 $1,727 0.27
OH District #3 $1,004 $945 0.25 OH District #3 $376 $177 0.07
TX District #1 $581 $510 0.31 TX District #1 $145 $2,538 0.77
TX District #2 $236 $2,480 1.27 TX District #2 $74 $569 0.30
TX District #3 $472 $408 0.33 TX District #3 $180 $2,232 0.91
WA District #1 $1,126 $428 $0 0.32 WA District #1 $70 $589 $0 0.14
WA District #2 $973 $613 $0 0.31 WA District #2 $97 $708 $1,518 0.46
WA District #3 $2,756 $8,594 $109 1.99 WA District #3 $0 $675 $485 0.20
WA District #4 $567 $580 $7 0.23 WA District #4 $67 $607 $0 0.14
WA District #5 $731 $394 $235 0.26 WA District #5 $0 $664 $98 0.15
special education Federal state local Weight
gifted 
education
Federal state local Weight
NC District #1 $1,180 $2,742 $8 0.87 NC District #1 $0 $398 $16 0.09
NC District #2 $1,242 $2,578 $600 1.03 NC District #2 $0 $262 $40 0.07
NC District #3 $1,048 $2,269 $745 0.85 NC District #3 $0 $260 $34 0.06
NC District #4 $1,387 $2,794 $584 1.12 NC District #4 $0 $288 $40 0.08
OH District #1 $1,159 $8,015 1.52 OH District #1 $0 $228 0.04
OH District #2 $1,130 $9,065 1.37 OH District #2 $0 $987 0.13
OH District #3 $1,064 $8,299 1.21 OH District #3 $0 $98 0.01
TX District #1 $1,319 $6,226 2.17 TX District #1 $39 $522 0.16
TX District #2 $1,198 $5,926 3.32 TX District #2 $0 $3,403 1.59
TX District #3 $849 $5,748 2.50 TX District #3 $0 $410 0.16
WA District #1 $1,292 $3,076 $11 0.91 WA District #1 $0 $0 $0 0.00
WA District #2 $1,559 $3,780 $3,125 1.66 WA District #2 $0 $222 $4 0.04
WA District #3 $1,403 $3,854 $1,182 1.12 WA District #3 $0 $0 $0 0.00
WA District #4 $1,360 $3,941 $259 1.12 WA District #4 $0 $257 $16 0.05
WA District #5 $1,337 $3,337 $696 1.04 WA District #5 $0 $1,049 $602 0.32
NOTE: The funding mechanisms and reporting structures in Texas and Ohio did not allow for consistently separating state and local dollars.   
These dollars are combined in this analysis.
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